If someone claims something happened on the fediverse without providing a link, they’re lying.

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Cake day: 2024年4月30日

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  • Ignoring the core principle of Capitalism, free markets, makes it impossible to actually talk about Capitalism in theory or in practice.

    The confusion comes from the fact that the word capitalism has two meanings. The original meaning, which the other person and myself are using, has nothing to do with free markets:

    1854, “condition of having capital;” from capital (n.1) + -ism. The meaning “political/economic system which encourages capitalists” is recorded from 1872 and originally was used disparagingly by socialists. The meaning “concentration of capital in the hands of a few; the power or influence of large capital” is from 1877.

    It was only later, in reaction to socialism, that capitalism began to take on this meaning you’re using, where it’s supposedly disconnected from class interests and is just about some abstract economic principle. But using the second definition, it’s impossible to talk about capitalism in practice because, as I said, such a system has never existed and will never exist.

    Your argument against can be used for every other economic system as well, so it becomes a matter of pros and cons which will never declare a clear winner and always demonstrate a mixed economy is best for everyone involved.

    Huh? Economic systems where the interests of capitalists are prioritized are best for the capitalists, economic systems where the interests of workers are prioritized are the best for workers. Also, aren’t you declaring a clear winner when you say you can, “always demonstrate a mixed economy is best for everyone involved?”


  • They’re talking about capitalism in practice. In practice, economic policy is shaped less by ideology and more by they relative power of economic classes. When the rich have power, they get policies that favor themselves enacted, and vice versa. It’s only in theory that capitalism is about “free markets,” in practice, the rich support free markets if they alternative is something that’s more harmful to themselves (like taxes and nationalization) and oppose them when the alternative is beneficial to themselves (subsidies).

    “Free market capitalism” is a purely theoretical idea that has never existed, and will never exist, because someone’s always going to have enough power to get the government to intervene in the economy to promote their own interests. Generally, left-wing people talking about capitalism mean capitalism in practice, not the theoretical idea.



  • Historically, you’re completely wrong.

    1. Hitler came to power with the support of capitalists (here meaning “people who own substantial capital” rather than “ideological supporters of capitalism”). They saw him as a way to maintain order against socialism and to break the power of unions. A similar story happened in Italy, and in other fascist countries.

    2. Many capitalists did in fact benefit from fascism. There’s some confusion about fascist economic policies, but you should know that the term “privatization” was first coined to describe the economic policy of Nazi Germany. When they nationalized companies, it was because they were minority owned, and often they were redistributed upwards to the capitalists.

    3. Labor rights suffered tremendously under fascism, with labor organizations exterminated, allowing capitalists to impose much worse conditions, lower pay, and longer hours on the workers, as well as using prisoners for slave labor. Any attempt to challenge these conditions would be considered treasonous, undermining the war effort.

    4. Even when their countries were defeated militarily, many capitalists got off scot-free. For example, the pharmaceutical company Bayer (which merged with Monsanto in 2016) was once a part of IG Farben, which manufactured Zyklon B for the gas chambers. After the war, Bayer rehired Nazis to high level positions, including for example Fritz ter Meer, who had been on IG Farben’s board of directors and became chairman of Bayer, despite being a convicted Nazi war criminal.











  • Yes, but it’s complicated. I’ll use Iran’s long tradition of nonviolence as a case study.

    In the late 1800’s when the shah tried to sell out tobacco farmers to foreign exploitation, and virtually everyone in the country opposed it, resulting in a tobacco boycott. Virtually everyone in the country participated it, including members of the shah’s own harem, and religious leaders issued a fatwa condemning anyone who violated it. The shah was forced to cave to pressure and reversed the decision.

    This boycott movement helped for organization that would set the stage for later (largely peaceful) protests that led to the shah signing a constitution and establishing a democratic parliament. Unfortunately, he died shortly afterwards, and his son was much less cooperative, and called on foreign assistance to shell parliament, and successfully restored himself to power.

    During WWI, Iran was invaded by the Ottoman, British, and Russian Empires, and the country suffered greatly from disease, famine, and the Armenian genocide, leading to over 2 million civilian deaths during the period. The Qajar dynasty collapsed, as did the Ottoman and Russian Empires, allowing Britain to dominate the power vacuum. They supported the new Pahlavi dynasty into power, there was a parliament, but the shah generally appointed whoever the British told him to as prime minister.

    At this point, oil had been discovered in Iran, and the Iranians were stuck with an awful, exploitative deal that the previous dynasty had signed, as part of their general policy of selling out every part of the country to foreign colonizers so the shah could have a bigger harem. This deal was substantially worse than the general deal the US offered (which was generally 50/50 between the country that owned the oil and the country that built the infrastructure to extract it). But the terms didn’t actually matter because the British violated them all the time, vastly underreporting how much oil they were extracting so that they paid virtually nothing, and the Iranians had zero oversight of their records. Britain relied on this oil to be one of the richest and most powerful nations on the planet, while the Iranians remained some of the poorest people in the world.

    For the next several decades, the Iranian people repeatedly asked Britain very nicely if they would possibly consider not stealing all their oil. And for those decades, the British completely stonewalled them, refused to consider any sorts of concessions whatsoever. Even with their own, hand-picked prime ministers, they still stonewalled them.

    Finally, in the 1950’s, and a peaceful democratic movement successfully pressured the shah to appoint a popular leader, Mohammad Mosaddegh, as prime minister - the shah finally became more afraid of popular discontent than he was of the British. Mosaddegh, after making attempts to negotiate, made a decision with overwhelming popular support, to nationalize the oil industry. This, however, led the British to impose a blockade, crippling the country’s economy.

    Mosaddegh was an idealist, and he believed the Americans would see his cause as just, connect it to their own revolution, and back him up against the British. At this point, most Iranians had neutral or positive views of the US, seeing them as well intentioned, if naive, not understanding how long the Iranians had been struggling against British colonialism. All of these perceptions were proven completely wrong, because, rather than backing them up, Eisenhower agreed to use the CIA to overthrow Mossadegh to protect BP’s profits and to ensure British cooperation with NATO and the Korean War. This was the first of the CIA’s coups of democratic governments.

    A stark example of this betrayal is that, the day before the coup, a US ambassador called Mossadegh and fed him a false story about how his supporters had been calling the embassy with death threats, and he was afraid he’d have to shut it down. Mossadegh - who had refused to crack down on (CIA funded) protests, or censor the (CIA controlled) press, or seek aid from the Soviets, or otherwise do anything to disrupt the infiltration out of concern for principles and respecting dissent -then issued as public statement calling for his supporters to cool it and stay off the streets. When his residence was attacked, no one was on the streets to come to his aid. He lived out the rest of his life under house arrest, while the shah used his absolute power to hunt down and exterminated the Iranian left - until he finally crossed the US and was himself overthrown by the current government.


    When the stakes were low (from a geopolitical perspective), like, some poor tobacco farmers trying to maintain their (still quite poor) lifestyle, nonviolence worked. When the stakes were higher, like, changing the whole structure of the government, nonviolence worked better than one might expect, but generally encountered violent resistance and counter-revolution and fell apart. When the stakes were very high, like, trying to get a world-spanning empire to stop stealing the resource it needed to dominate the world, nonviolence was not very effective at all.

    Being in Iran’s position, it really wouldn’t matter what they did to try to appease Westerners, so long as they assert control over their natural resources - so they don’t really bother. The goal of nonviolence is to be “in the right” but Iran’s history proves that you can be 100% “in the right” and still lose because foreigners don’t know/care about what’s being done to you, or are propagandized to side with the oppressor.

    This doesn’t necessarily apply to protests in the US, but it can. If you’re a nonthreatening old white lady and your goals are not too disruptive to the empire, then sure, do nonviolence. But if you’re someone who the news could villainize, who people will assume the worst of just because of your race or religion, then they’re probably going to characterize you as violent whether you are or not. And if your goals are something that would disrupt the ruling class’s hold on power, then understand that the only reason they aren’t gunning you down is that they aren’t afraid of you - the real dangerous part about nonviolence is that it can be effective, and if power is threatened it will respond with force.


  • 100%. A credible threat of violence is the real sweet spot, it’s the currency that the whole world operates by. Actual violence is primarily only useful for establishing that threat.

    Like, Brian Thompson was an evil person but he was just a cog in a machine and not that hard to replace. However, his killing spooked the industry, and at least for a time, they stopped denying so many claims, which saved many lives - because there was a credible threat that if they deny someone’s claim, they (or someone who cares about them) might kill those responsible. On the other side of the equation, the state was very concerned about finding the killer/someone to pin the blame on, because they needed to establish a credible threat of violence against anyone who might follow his example.

    People in America seem to love “going postal,” just one big dramatic act that only you know about and that you won’t walk away from. But that doesn’t really set up a credible threat for the future. Thompson’s killer at least had the good sense to try to get away - if he did, then he could continue providing a credible threat, and he would also provide a “proof of concept” for people looking to fight back without necessarily dying.

    Ideally, if you could have a more formal organization that could lay out demands and red lines, it would add to predictability and help keep the threat of violence consistent and predictable. Otherwise, there’s just a vague sense that maybe someone out there will be set off by something, but it’s hard to negotiate with that, hard to say which actions might set someone off. Stochastic violence isn’t ideal, but if more formal organizations are subverted in the various ways they are, then violence becomes less controlled and directed, and the credible threat of violence becomes harder to establish.


  • Interesting how the paper picks East Timor/Indonesia as a case study but makes no mention of the massacres of the PKI and suspected communists, which the US was ambivalent, if not supportive about.

    Any serious study of resistance movements around the world will paint a very different picture, one in which nonviolence is frequently met with slaughter, and people turn to violence specifically because nonviolence failed.

    The fact of the matter is that people living in the imperial core cannot be well versed in the history of every country in the world (to the extent that we can even exert influence in the first place), and this allows the media to either ignore things like the massacres in Indonesia, or spin them in such a way to justify the preferred side through biased framing. The thing the paper cites as a major determining factor of success or failure is defections from security forces, but what if those security forces come from thousands of miles away?

    Trying to assert a universal principle on a tactical level regarding such broad categories is kind of silly in the first place. It’s too broad. You have to assess what you’re trying to accomplish and formulate a strategy to get there based on the particular situation you find yourself in.

    From “The Jakarta Method:”

    This was another very difficult question I had to ask my interview subjects, especially the leftists from Southeast Asia and Latin America. When we would get to discussing the old debates between peaceful and armed revolution; between hardline Marxism and democratic socialism, I would ask:

    “Who was right?”

    In Guatemala, was it Árbenz or Che who had the right approach? Or in Indonesia, when Mao warned Aidit that the PKI should arm themselves, and they did not? In Chile, was it the young revolutionaries in the MIR who were right in those college debates, or the more disciplined, moderate Chilean Communist Party?

    Most of the people I spoke with who were politically involved back then believed fervently in a nonviolent approach, in gradual, peaceful, democratic change. They often had no love for the systems set up by people like Mao. But they knew that their side had lost the debate, because so many of their friends were dead. They often admitted, without hesitation or pleasure, that the hardliners had been right. Aidit’s unarmed party didn’t survive. Allende’s democratic socialism was not allowed, regardless of the détente between the Soviets and Washington.

    Looking at it this way, the major losers of the twentieth century were those who believed too sincerely in the existence a liberal international order, those who trusted too much in democracy, or too much in what the United States said it supported, rather than what it really supported—what the rich countries said, rather than what they did. That group was annihilated.