I like btdu which is essentially ncdu, but works in a way that is useful even if advanced btrfs features (CoW, compression etc.) are used.
I like btdu which is essentially ncdu, but works in a way that is useful even if advanced btrfs features (CoW, compression etc.) are used.
I am afraid you are still a bit misled; WireGuard is exactly what they use for the demo video. In general the underlying protocol does not matter, since the vulnerability is about telling the system to direct the packages to the attacker, completely bypassing the VPN.
I really need to try out Mercury one day. When we did a project in Prolog at uni, it felt cool, but also incredibly dynamic in a bad way. There were a few times when we misspelled some clause, which normally would be an error, but in our case it just meant falsehood. We then spent waaay to much time searching for these. I can’t help but think that Mercury would be as fun as Prolog, but less annoying.
I actually use from time to time the Bower email client, which is written in Mercury.
My understanding is that all issues are patched in the mentioned releases, the config flag is not needed for that.
The config flag has been added because supporting clients with different endianness is undertested and most people will never use it. So if it is going to generate vulnerabilities, it makes sense to be able to disable it easily, and to disable it by default on next major release. Indeed XWayland had it disabled by default already, so only the fourth issue (ProcRenderAddGlyphs
) is relevant there if that default is not changed.
Ultimately you can configure these however you want. On my 5600X, I easily got one full execution of scrypt to last 34.6 seconds (--logN 27 -r 1 -p 1
in the example CLI), and one full execution of bcrypt to last 47.5 seconds (rounds=20
and the bcrypt
Python library).
This kind of configuration (ok, not this long, but definitely around 1 second per execution) is very common in things like password managers or full disk encryption.
I’m betting there’s probably something that generates the key from a vastly smaller player input, i.e what gameobjects you interacted with, in what order, or what did you press/place somwhere. But that also means that the entropy is probably in the bruteforcable range, and once you find the function that decrypts the secrets, it should be pretty easy to find the function that generates the key, and the inputs it takes.
When handling passwords, it is standard practice to use an intentionally costly (in CPU, memory, or both) algorithm to derive the encryption key from the password. Maybe the dev can reuse this? The resulting delay could easily be masked with some animation.
I got curious and decided to check this out. This value was set to the current one in 2009: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/341c87bf346f57748230628c5ad6ee69219250e8 The reasoning makes sense, but I guess is not really relevant to our situation, and according to the newest version of the comment 2^16 is not a hard limit anymore.
Phoenotopia: Awakening – an amazing metroidvania-related game. Relatively more popular than the other games I list, but is honestly one of my favorite games of all time.
Vision: Soft Reset – a metroidvania, but you can travel backwards and forwards in time and this really matters for gameplay.
Bombe – Minesweeper, but instead of solving the puzzles manually, you create rules (“if there is a cell with the number N and there are N empty cells around it, mark them all as mines”) which the game applies automatically.
SOLAS 128 – a puzzle game where you redirect signals in a huge machine, just a great experience if you like puzzle games.
The bootloader is stored unencrypted on your disk. Therefore it is trivial to modify, the other person just needs to power down your PC, take the hard drive out, mount it on their own PC and modify stuff. This is the Evil Maid attack the other person talked about.
Edit: Actually, I thought about it, and I don’t think clang’s behavior is wrong in the examples he cites. Basically, you’re using an uninitialized variable, and choosing to use compiler settings which make that legal, and the compiler is saying “Okay, you didn’t give me a value for this variable, so I’m just going to pick one that’s convenient for me and do my optimizations according to the value I picked.” Is that the best thing for it to do? Maybe not; it certainly violates the principle of least surprise. But, it’s hard for me to say it’s the compiler’s fault that you constructed a program that does something surprising when uninitialized variables you’re using happen to have certain values.
You got it correct in this edit. But the important part is that gcc will also do this, and they both are kinda expected to do so. The article cites some standard committee discussions: somebody suggested ensuring that signed integer overflow in C++20 will not UB, and the committee decided against it. Also, somebody suggested not allowing to optimize out the infinite loops like 13 years ago, and then the committee decided that it should be allowed. Therefore, these optimisations are clearly seen as features.
And these are not theoretical issues by any means, there has been this vulnerability in the kernel for instance: https://lwn.net/Articles/342330/ which happened because the compiler just removed a null pointer check.
You could make an argument that not using banking apps decreases your security, since most banks use either SMS or those apps as the second factor while confirming the operations. It is true that the apps are of varying quality, but SMS is not really a serious alternative. Some banks do have apps that are limited to confirming operations, and one bank where I live did recently start accepting U2F, which is amazing news.
Same for Polish. One funny thing I’ve noticed is that in one of the examples, the person tries to stay at a hotel, and the price is clearly in the old currency, which has not been used since 1997.
It seems OP wanted to pass the file name to
-k
, but this parameter takes the password itself and not a filename:-k password The password to derive the key from. This is for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by the -pass argument.
So, as I understand, the password would be not the first line of
/etc/ssl/private/etcBackup.key
, but the string/etc/ssl/private/etcBackup.key
itself. It seems that-kfile /etc/ssl/private/etcBackup.key
or-pass file:/etc/ssl/private/etcBackup.key
is what OP wanted to use.